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THE RIGHT TO BAR ARMS
"A messenger from Henry, our dread Uiege, to know the
reason of these arms in peace."
In his crime message to the first session of the Ninetieth Con-
gress, President Johnson requested the enactment of a federal
gun control law. That bill,1 designated the State Firearms Con-
trol Assistance Act of 19672 and commonly referred to as the
Mail Order Gun Control Law or as the Dodd Bill, was intro-
duced by Senator Dodd on February 9, 1967. The Dodd Bill is
apparently the final product of several years of committee work
and extensive hearings.3 The consideration of this measure and
several others preliminary to it4 focused attention upon the sec-
ond amendment to the Constitution, the so-called "lost" amend-
ment." The tremendous controversy precipitated by these efforts
has pressed home the question of the reason, scope, and limita-
tion on the legislative power of the constitutional guaranty of
a right to keep and bear arms.
It shall be the thesis of this article that the second amendment
does not confer any individual right to bear arms except when
such conduct is necessary to the militia. Indeed, the better con-
stitutional issue is whether the state and federal government
have the right to bar arms entirely. Finally, a review of exist-
ing federal and state firearms regulations will be offered. Policy
arguments touching the necessity and desirability of various
firearm regulation schemes will be left to those presently engag-
ing in an extensive dialogue.
I. Tim ComMoN LAw
There was no individual right to keep or bear arms in the
common law. The Statute of Northampton, promulgated in
* SHAKESPEARE, MG HENRY THE SIXTH, Part 2, Act V, Scene 1, Line 17.
1. S. 1, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
2. Id. at 1.
3. The hearings were held by the Subcommittee To Investigate Juvenile
Delinquency of the Committee On the Judiciary, United States Senate. Sena-
tor Dodd is chairman; Subcommittee members are Philip Hart of Michigan,
Birch Bayh of Indiana, Quentin Burdick of North Dakota, Joseph Tydings of
Maryland, Roman Hruska of Nebraska, Hiram Fong of Hawaii and Jacob
Javits of New York. The inclusive dates of the last hearings were May 19
through July 27, 1965, during the first session of the 89th Congress.
4. S. 14, S. 1180, S. 1592, and S. 1965, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
5. E.g., Spreacher, The Lost Amendment, 51 A.B.AJ. 554 (1965).
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1328, provided that no man should "go nor ride armed by night
or by day in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the justices
or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere .... 1"6 A later statute
provided that no person who had not lands of the yearly value
of £100, other than the son and heir of an esquire or other person
of higher degree, should be allowed even to keep a gun.7 These
offenses, indictable under the common law of England, became
the common law of the American colonies."
Parallel to this development was one of longer gestation, the
birth of citizen-soldier militias. Plato, counseling about 350
B. C. that cities, like individuals, are often not secure against
wrong, concluded that "all men must train for war, not in war-
time but while they are living in peace." 9 Contemporaneously,
Aristotle made the connection between citizen soldiers and de-
mocrary, noting that in topography allowing the use of cavalry
and heavy infantry oligarchies thrived since horses and cannon
were incidents of wealth, while democracies prevailed in coun-
tries whose terrain restricted wars to the light arms owned by
most citizens. 10
In England, the great pressure for a people's right to organize
a militia arose in response to the attempts of Charles II (1660-
1685) to maintain a standing army of 5,000.11 His successor,
James II (1685-1688) increased the troop strength to 30,000,12
used them to suppress Monmouth's Rebellion and as a conse-
quence of the rebellion, deprived many Protestant militiamen of
arms. The Declaration of Rights by the Convention Parliament
after the flight of James II condemned these acts as subversive
to liberty and contrary to law. The subsequent statutory Eng-
6. 2 Edw. III., c. 3 (1328).
7. 22 Car. II, c. 25, § 3.
8. BisHoP, STATUTORY CmrE~s, § 784 (3rd ed. 1901).
9. PLATO, LAws viii, 127 (Bury transl. 1917). Plato, continuing, alluded to
the fact that an armed citizenry acts as a check on oppression by the ruler, sug-
gesting that "the ruler through fear of the subject, will never allow him to
become.., in any way warlike." Id. at 139.
10. 6 AniSTOTLE, POLITICS ch. 7, 271 (Jowett transl. 1908). "'When the coun-
try is adapted for cavalry, then a strong oligarchy is likely to be established.
For . . . only rich men can afford horses. The second form of oligarchy
prevails when the country is adapted to heavy infantry; for this service is
better suited to the rich than the poor. But the light armed . . . element is
wholly democratic . .. ."
11. THE FDEAnis r No. 26 (Hamilton). See also 1 BLACKSTONE, COMaiN-
TAImES 414 (Wendell ed. 1847).
12. Id.
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lish Bill of Rights, based on the Declaration, prohibited stand-
ing armies without the consent of Parliament and provided that
Protestant subjects might keep arms suitable to their conditions
and as allowed by law. These two rights, the control of standing
armies and the consequent arming of the citizen militia as a
means of securing that control, were conceived to have pre-
existed the Bill of Rights. They survived the decline of the
religious factionalism that was their impetus, reappearing when
Blackstone in 1765, listing the means of assuring the absolute
rights of man, the so-called "auxiliary rights," included the
bearing of such arms for defense as are "suitable to their condi-
tion and degree, and such as are allowed by law; which is also
declared by the same statute, 1 W. & M., st. 2, c. 2 .... ,,13 That
great legal scholar thereafter continued, "Nothing . . . ought to
be more guarded against ... than making the military.. . too
distinct from the people . . . it should be wholly composed of
natural subjects ... [who] enlisted for a short and limited time
... live intermixed with the people . . ."'4 Adam Smith, in
his classic TVealth of Nations, echoed the cry that "Men of re-
publican principles have been jealous of a standing army as
injurious to liberty."'' 5 And Baron Montesquieu, a great influ-
ence on early American political theory, defined as a requisite
of liberty that armies should consist of citizen soldiers to avoid
military tyranny such as Marius established in Rome by enlist-
ing the rabble, and giving the army an identity separate from
that of the people. Thus, by the time of the American Revolu-
tion the right of the people to bear arms for a militia as a sub-
stitute for and check on standing armies was firmly established
in the common law and other elements of the political main-
stream from which flowed our American institutions.
II. Tim CoNsT mIoNAL Oinxs
In its original form, the second amendment, introduced by
James Madison in the House in the first session of the First
Congress, read:
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed; a well armed and well regulated militia being the
13. 1 BLACKSTONE, COmENTAxIES 143 (Wendell ed. 1847).
14. Id. at 414.
15. 5 A. SmITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS cl. 1 (Bullock ed. 1909).
[Vol. 19
3
Mann: The Right to Bar Arms
Published by Scholar Commons, 1967
NoTEs
best security of a free country; but no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render
military service in person.
16
As reported out of committee, the amendment read:
A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the
people, being the best security of a free state, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but
no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear
arms.1
7
It is important to note that in both versions the concept of
conscientious objection is phrased in individual terms, i.e., "no
person," while the concept of a right to bear arms is phrased in
the collective terms "the people" and "the body of the people."
This contrast is consistent with the conclusion that while the
protection of religious scruples was viewed as an individual
right, the right to bear arms was seen as a collective one, obtain-
ing for the body of the people through a militia rather than for
the benefit of any single citizen.
Attention should also be directed to the fact that the amend-
ment employs the word "arms," traditionally a military term,
rather than the description "weapons" or "firearms." A number
of courts have held that to extend the right beyond the militia
would pervert the meaning of "arms."' 8
The debates, chiefly concerned with the retention of the con-
scientious objector provision (which was dropped), contain no
mention whatever of any individual right to own or use arms.
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts did state that the purpose of
providing for a militia was to discourage standing armies which
he described as "the bane of liberty."'
9
State constitutions in effect in 1789 further bear out the con-
clusion that no individual right to bear arms existed in the
16. 1 AxxA.s OF Co.NG. 434 (1789).
17. Id. at 749.
18. See, e.g., Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 1, 72 S.E. 260 (1911) ; Hill v. State,
53 Ga. 472 (1874) ; English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872). Most writers agree.
See, e.g., 2 Bisiop, CTImiNAL LAv § 124: "[T]he provision protects only the
right to 'keep' such 'arms' as are used for purposes of war, in distinction from
those which are employed in quarrels and broils.... since only the former are
properly known by the name 'arms' and such only are adapted to promote
'the security of a free state'."
19. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 750 (1789).
1967]
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American law when the Bill of Rights was formulated. The
Rhode Island Charter of 1663 and the 1776 constitutions of
Connecticut, Delaware, and New Jersey were silent on the mat-
ters of both militias and bearing arms. Five state constitutions
mentioned militias but contained no mention of any right to
bear arms.
20
Three state constitutions granted a right to bear arms that is
expressly construed as a means of defending the state.21 All
three were phrased in terms of "the people" as were other collec-
tive rights in all of them, while the terms "individually," "per-
sons," "citizens," etc. were used where individual rights were
guaranteed.
The remaining two state constitutions might be construed as
having recognized an individual right to bear arms for self de-
fense. Both the Vermont Constitution of 1777 and the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution of 1776 contained the guaranty "[t]hat the
people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves
and the State. .... ,,22 The remainders of both articles contained
prohibitions against standing armies and guarantees of civilian
control of the militia. Again, in both these documents the term
"people" was used throughout to denote collective rather than
individual rights. Thus it seems more reasonable to construe the
phrase "defense of themselves" as referring to collective rather
than individual self-defense.
The conclusion is inescapable that at the time of the origin of
the second amendment neither the Congress nor the states con-
templated any individual right to keep and bear arms but were,
instead, preoccupied with the distrust of standing armies and
20. The Georgia Constitution of 1777, arts. XXXIV and XXXV, provided for
the structure of a militia; the Maryland Constitution of 1776, art. XXV, un-
derscored its importance ("a well regulated militia is the proper and natural
defense of a free government") as did the New Hampshire Constitution of
1774, art. XXIV, providing that "[a] well regulated militia is the proper,
natural, and sure defense of a state"; the New York Constitution of 1777, art.
XL, provided for the state (rather than the militiamen) to provide the arms;
and the South Carolina Constitution of 1778, art. XLII, ensured civilian control
of the militia.
21. MASS. CoNsT. art. XVII (1780) "The people have a right to keep and to
bear arms for the common defense. . . ."; N.C. CoNsT. art. XVII (1776) "The
people have a right to bear arms, for the defense of the state . . . ."; VA. Bmu
or RIGHTS 13 (1776) "A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the
people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural and safe defense of a free
state . .. ."
22. VT. CONST. art. XV (1777); PA. CONST. art. XIII (1776).
[Vol. 19
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the importance of providing for militias. In this context, then,
an individual was endowed with the right to bear arms expressly
and only for the purpose of serving in the state militias. It is in
this context that the courts have subsequently construed the
amendment.
III. JuDiOiAL FATE OF P A
A. State Regulations in the Courts
Although a few early cases arising from state controls on fire-
arms went so far as to hold that there was an inalienable indi-
vidual right to bear arms for self protection,23 that interpreta-
tion has not survived. The overwhelming majority of state cases
take the position of Commonwealth v. Murphy24 that "it has
been almost universally held that the legislature may regulate
and limit the mode of carrying arms." 25 Thus an act making
illegal the carrying of certain deadly weapons does no violence
to the second amendment,26 nor does an act requiring a license
to carry revolvers, 27 neither does a state law forbidding the car-
rying of concealed weapons. 28 Numerous state decisions contain
express language to the effect that no body of citizens, other
than members of the militia, has a constitutional right to bear
arms.
29
23. See, e.g., Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90, 13 Am. Dec. 251 (Ky.
1822). Bliss is probably the leading case cited by the proponents of an individual
right; however, its result has been expressly repudiated by a number of courts:
"This ruling [Bliss] has not been followed, but severely criticized. The deci-
sions are practically unanimous to the contrary." Strickland v. State, 137 Ga.
1, 2, 72 S.E. 260, 261 (1911). "[T]his decision [Bliss] has never been follow-
ed." City of Salina v. Blaksley, 72 Kan. 230, 231, 83 Pac. 619, 620 (1905).
"The early decision to the contrary . .. [Bliss] has not been generally ap-
proved." Commonwealth v. Murphy, 166 Mass. 171, 44 N.E. 138 (1896).
24. 166 Mass. 191, 44 N.E. 138 (1896).
25. Id. Concurring results from eight other state courts are listed.
26. English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872). The decision is based on the dis-
tinction drawn between those arms useful and proper to a state militia and
those primarily useful in individual strife.
27. Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 1, 72 S.E. 260 (1911). This beautifully
documented opinion also stresses the general police power.
28. Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564 (1882). The court sees the constitutional
provision as springing from the "former tyrannical practice of disarming the
subjects so as to render them powerless against oppression. It is not intended
to afford citizens the means of prosecuting their private broils in a free gov-
ernment." Id. at 566.
29. See, e.g., City of Salina v. Blaksley, 72 Kan. 230, 83 Pac. 619 (1905).
"The second amendment refers to the people as a collective body. It deals ex-
clusively with the military. Individual rights are not considered . . .
1967] NOTES
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The Supreme Court has twice directly and once by dictum had
occasion to examine the constitutionality of state laws governing
firearms. In 1886 the Court upheld an Illinois statute which
forbade drilling or parading with arms in cities and towns
unless authorized by law.30 Eight years later the Court upheld
a Texas statute prohibiting the carrying of deadly weapons
since the restraints of the second amendment "operate only upon
the Federal power, and have no reference whatever to proceed-
ings in State courts."31 Finally in 1897, the Court, in dictum,
held it axiomatic that the second amendment "is not infringed
by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons. .... -12
There is no constitutional bar to state regulation of arms.
B. Fi ederaZ Regulations in the Courts
Defendants charged with violations of the National Firearms
Act of 1931 33 or the Federal Firearms Act of 19383 have raised
the constitutional issue of the right to bear arms, all unsuccess-
fully. In United States v. Adams36 a federal district court dis-
posed of defendant's demurrer on constitutional grounds by
holding that the second amendment "refers to the militia ... to
the collective body and not individual rights."3 6 In a 1939
case37 involving the transportation of a sawed-off shotgun in
interstate commerce (in violation of the National Firearms Act)
the Supreme Court had its best opportunity in 150 years to pass
30. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886). The Court reached the expected
result by means of incorrect reasoning. It apparently construed the right to a
militia as accruing to the federal government rather than to the states.
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute
the reserve military force or reserve militia of the United States as well
as of the States; and in view of this prerogative of the General Govern-
ment as well as of its general powers, the States cannot, even laying the
constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from
keeping and bearing arms so as to deprive the United States of their
rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the
people from performing their duty to the General Government.
Id. at 265.
This view antedated the absorption of the state militias into the National
Guard, so that not even this possible justification applies. The reasoning in the
quoted passage has been ignored in subsequent decisions; it is dictum anyway.
31. Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894).
32. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897).
33. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5862 (1934).
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-909 (1938).
35. 11 F. Supp. 216 (S.D. Fla. 1935).
36. Id. at 219.
37. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
[Vol. 19
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directly on the constitutional issue. It held that in the absence
of proof that the shotgun bore some
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of
a well regulated militia we cannot say the second amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon
is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its
use could contribute to the common defense.38
Here was a clear holding that the right to bear arms is col-
lective and dependent on the use of those arms for militia pur-
poses. However, this decision implied that the more suitable a
weapon might be for militia purposes, the less it would be sub-
ject to Congressional control. This implication was quickly
negatived in two circuit court holdings which the Supreme
Court did not disturb. In United States v. Tot3 9 the third cir-
cuit examined the common law, constitutional convention and
learned writers to conclude that, unlike the first amendment, the
second amendment "was not adopted with individual rights in
mind, but as a protection for the states in the maintenance of
their militia organizations against possible encroachments by the
Federal power.140 In Cases v. United States41 the first circuit
concluded that the amendment did not give private individuals
a right to possess deadly weapons of any character, whether or
not they were of the kind that would be useful to a well regu-
lated militia.
Thus, apparently the only restraint on the federal power to
control arms is that the Congress not regulate them in such a
way as to impair the efficiency of state militias. However, it is
submitted that this restraint is meaningless when one considers
that state militias have passed out of existence.
IV. THE PRESENT DAY "WLL REGuLATED fnirrxA"
In a memorandum to the Dodd Committee, 42 Attorney Gen-
eral Katzenbach concluded that the "well regulated militia" is
38. Id. at 178.
39. 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463
(1943).
40. Id. at 266.
41. 131 F2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943).
42. Hearings Before the Subcommittee To Investigate Juvenile Delinquency
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. at 43.
1967] NOTES
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today the National Guard. If this conclusion obtains, it is quite
arguable that any state rights under the second amendment are
extinguished, dying with the state's interest (the militia). A
review of the history of the militias bears out the Attorney Gen-
eral's conclusion. Two developments are germane: the arming
of the militias by the federal government and the passage of
those bodies from state to federal authority.
In 1808, Congress provided 200,000 dollars annually to pur-
chase arms for the whole of the enrolled militia, title to the arms
passing to the states. 43 In 1887, Congress doubled the appropri-
ation, imposed restrictions on it and provided that the arms
remained the property of the United States. 44 From that date,
the federal government has supplied arms to the militia under
strict controls and continuing federal ownership.45 The 1903
Act,40 procured by Secretary of War Elihu Root, is the most
significant in this area, for there Congress provided for the
organizing, training, and eguipping of all militias that met its
criteria. Today the National Guard is a part of the army of the
United States, subject at all times to federal call.
For the last half-century, since Congress has provided the
arms for the former state militias, it has no longer been neces-
sary for any man to bear his own arms for use in that militia;
further, under existing regulations only federal government
issue weapons may be used. Additionally, it is clear that the
present day "well regulated militia" is a federal entity, the
National Guard (and since 1914, the Naval Militia47). It could
be argued that the state militia still exists in the form of
standby home guard units formed for emergencies when the
National Guard is called away. Material here would be the
policy question of how these citizens should be armed; no
opinion is ventured.
43. Act of Apr. 23, 1808, ch. 55, 2 Stat. 490.
44. Act of Feb. 12, 1887, ci. 129, 24 Stat. 401.
45. See Act of Feb. 24, 1897, ch. 310, 29 Stat. 592; Act of Jan. 21, 1903,
ch. 196, § 13, 32 Stat. 775, 777; Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 204, § 8, 35 Stat. 399,
401-402; Act of Jme 23, 1916, ch. 134, §§ 67, 83-87, 39 Stat. 166, 199-200, 203-
205; Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 32 U.S.C. § 710 (1964).
46. Act of Jan. 21, 1903, ch. 196, § 13, 32 Stat. 775, 777.
47. Created in 1914; see Act of Feb. 16, 1914, ch. 14, 38 Stat. 283.
[Vol. 19
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V. FEDE LEixsLArioN
The National Firearms Act of 193448 imposes a tax on the
manufacture or transfer of enumerated firearms (those com-
monly thought of as "gangster weapons"), requiring that they
be registered with the Treasury Department. The act is admin-
istered by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal
Revenue Service. It covers machine guns, submachine guns, and
all other fully automatic weapons, all cut-down or sawed-off
shotguns and rifles, mufflers, and silencers. The act does not
encompass pistols, revolvers, sporting and target rifles and shot-
guns, flintlock and percussion weapons, and ammunition.
The Federal Firearms Act of 193849 is also administered by
the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue
Service, not because it is a taxing measure, but simply because
by 1938 this Division had built up an expertise in firearm regu-
lations after four years of administering the National Firearms
Act. It regulates the interstate and foreign commerce in all
types of firearms and pistol and revolver ammunition by requir-
ing the licensing of manufacturers, dealers, and importers of
said items or components thereof. It is enervated by its loose
criteria for granting licenses. Experts estimate that more than
two-thirds of the licensees are not legitimate dealers but are
either buying for their own use or reselling to those, who, as an
excluded class under state or federal statutes, cannot buy from
a bona-fide dealer. The heart of the act is its prohibition of
sales to anyone under indictment or convicted of a crime pun-
ishable by a term of more than one year, or any fugitive from
justice. This section (902d) is utterly vitiated by its limitation
that the dealer selling the firearm must know or have reasonable
cause to know that the buyer is under indictment, etc.
These two statutes comprise the direct federal firearm con-
trols. In addition there are postal regulations governing the
shipment of concealable weapons, Department of State regula-
tions governing international traffic in arms, tariff regulations
and federal sales taxes on guns, and prohibitions of loaded fire-
arms on commercial air carriers and of the use or display of
firearms in national parks.
48. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5862 (1934).
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-909 (1938).
1967] NOTES
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The Dodd Bill (S. 1) would vastly increase the dealer license
fees to rout out the purchasers posing as retailers, forbid sales of
any gun to anyone under eighteen years of age and of handguns
to anyone under twenty-one. Additionally, it would forbid sales
to a non-resident of the dealer's state, effectively ending inter-
state mail order purchases. Finally, it would require police
approval to buy certain types of weapons and require that rec-
ords of purchasers be kept (name, age, address). Essentially,
this bill is designed to govern interstate purchases, leaving state
laws to control intrastate dealings. Even if the second amend-
ment were construed as guaranteeing an individual right, it
would not apply to this bill. The proposed legislation does not
infringe on the right to keep and bear arms; it merely makes
purchase a little more inconvenient.
VI. STATE LEGisLATiON
Today, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have
statutes regulating firearms.50 The two most striking character-
istics of these state laws are their diversity and their impotency.
Seven states require a permit to purchase a handgun,0' nine-
teen report such sales to the police,5 2 four have no minimum age
requirement for such a purchase.58 Twenty-three states require
dealers in guns to be licensed. 4 Eighteen states require a license
for carrying a pistol in a car.55 This complete lack of uniform-
ity is compounded by diversity within states as well, where,
often, municipalities have restrictions more severe than those
embodied in the state statute.
50. For a listing of the states and their statutes see Note, Firearms Legisla-
tion, 18 VAlNt. L. Rnv. 1362 (1965).
51. Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina.
52. Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia.
53. Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, New Mexico.
54. Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota (some counties), Oregon (some counties), Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia (some counties), Washington,
West Virginia.
55. Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington.
[Vol. 19
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State laws regulating purchase and recordation are exercises
in futility in the present absence of similar federal control of
mail order guns. A prospective buyer, unable to purchase within
the state because of disability under the state statute may simply
order the desired weapon from an out-of-state company. Thus,
law enforcement divisions from virtually every state have lent
support to the efforts of the Dodd Committee.
VII. CoCLUSION
It is posited that the dominant feature of the second amend-
ment is the guaranty of a militia and that any right to bear
arms is conditioned on its relationship to this guaranty. The
amendment is declarative of a collective right. The state gov-
ernments may regulate arms in any way and to any extent they
choose without infringing on second amendment rights of their
polity. Federal control of arms is violative of the second amend-
ment only when it impairs the functioning of a state militia, a
legal conclusion rendered nugatory by the fact of federal ab-
sorption of the national guard. Assuredly, the "right" of fed-
eral and state governments to bar arms, whatever its fate on
other constitutional grounds, is not confined by the "lost"
amendment.
JAmES L. MAwN, II
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